The frontomedian cortex (FMC) has been shown to be important for coherence processes in language comprehension, i.e., for establishing the pragmatic connection between successively presented sentences. The same brain region has a role during theory-of-mind processes, i.e., during the attribution of other people's actions to their motivations, beliefs, or emotions. In this study, we used event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging at 3 T to disentangle the relative contributions of the FMC to theory-of-mind (ToM) and coherence processes, respectively. The BOLD response of nine participants was recorded while they listened to pragmatically coherent or unrelated sentence pairs. Using a logic instruction for inanimate sentence pairs, ToM processing was discouraged during the first part of the experiment. Using explicit ToM instructions for sentence pairs mentioning human protagonists, ToM processing was induced during the second part. In three of the resulting four conditions a significant increase in the BOLD response was observed in FMC: when ToM instructions were given, both coherent and incoherent trials elicited frontomedian activation, in replication of previous results showing involvement of the FMC during ToM tasks. When logic instructions were given, the coherent trials, but not the incoherent trials, activated the FMC. These results clearly show that the FMC plays a role in coherence processes even in the absence of concomitant ToM processes. The findings support the view of this cortex having a domain-independent functionality related to volitional aspects of the initiation and maintenance of nonautomatic cognitive processes.