Functional imaging of ‘theory of mind’

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Abstract

Our ability to explain and predict other people's behaviour by attributing to them independent mental states, such as beliefs and desires, is known as having a ‘theory of mind’. Interest in this very human ability has engendered a growing body of evidence concerning its evolution and development and the biological basis of the mechanisms underpinning it. Functional imaging has played a key role in seeking to isolate brain regions specific to this ability. Three areas are consistently activated in association with theory of mind. These are the anterior paracingulate cortex, the superior temporal sulci and the temporal poles bilaterally. This review discusses the functional significance of each of these areas within a social cognitive network.

Section snippets

Theory of mind mechanisms

There is, as yet, no computational account of the mechanisms that underlie theory of mind or mentalizing ability. However, it is thought to depend on an innate cognitive mechanism [1], possibly dedicated and domain specific 2, 3. Evidence from studies of autism support this theory. Autism is a biologically based disorder that seems to be characterized by a selective impairment in theory of mind 4, 5 (for example, see Box 1) that is able to account for many of the deficits in communication,

Anterior paracingulate cortex: the decoupling mechanism

To date, functional imaging studies have activated networks of regions in association with theory of mind 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 that involve both common areas (the anterior paracingulate, the STS and the temporal poles) and unique task-related areas. However, two recent studies suggest that the anterior paracingulate cortex is the key region for mentalizing 17, 18. In contrast to the earlier studies that have all used ‘off-line’ paradigms requiring the volunteer to consider a scenario and

The role of the STS

In addition to the anterior paracingulate cortex, two regions, the STS and the temporal poles bilaterally, consistently activate in studies of theory-of-mind ability. This activity is probably not related to the decoupling that is necessary for mentalizing. The functions of these regions might relate to abilities that aid mentalizing. It is from these pre-existing abilities that mentalizing has evolved. The precise role of the STS is still unclear. Gallagher et al. [13] found predominantly

The role of the temporal poles

The temporal poles are generally associated with object and face recognition in primates [57]. However, functional imaging studies of humans have activated the temporal poles in association with the broader context of episodic memory retrieval in visual and auditory domains. Thus the temporal poles are active during the recollection of familiar faces and scenes [58], the recognition of familiar voices [59], emotional memory retrieval [60] and autobiographical memory retrieval [61]. Taken

The amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex

It is clear that mentalizing recruits regions of the brain involved in the general interpretation of behaviour that contribute to a neural network of social cognition, the extent of which remains to be identified and the specific functions to be determined. Other brain regions have been implicated in social cognition, which might also contribute to this network, in particular the amygdala and the orbitofrontal cortex [19]. There have been suggestions that the amygdala might play a part in

Conclusions

Neuroimaging data have provided compelling evidence to suggest that our ability to mentalize is mediated by a circumscribed region of the anterior paracingulate cortex. Nonetheless, this region seems to be strongly associated with a more widespread network of brain regions involved in social cognition. Neuroimaging is set to play a significant role in determining the precise functions of the neural substrates comprising this network and the mechanisms underlying theory of mind. In particular,

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