Strategies of control, aggression, and morality in preschoolers: An evolutionary perspective

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Abstract

Moral reasoning, moral affect, social problem solving skills, and social preferences were assessed in 163 ethnically mixed preschoolers (2.86–5.95 years). Participants were rated by their teachers on prosocial and coercive strategies of control, success at resource control, and aggression (overt and relational). Based on their employment of coercive and prosocial strategies of resource control, the children were categorized as bistrategic controllers, coercive controllers, prosocial controllers, noncontrollers, or typicals. Teacher-rated relational aggression was positively associated with moral maturity in girls. Bistrategic controllers, although aggressive, were morally mature and preferred play partners by their peers. The results are discussed in terms of hypotheses that arise from evolutionary theory which suggests that highly effective resource controllers would be simultaneously aggressive and yet well aware of moral norms. The findings are contrasted with alternative hypotheses that might arise variously from traditional and prevailing approaches.

Introduction

The ethics and morality of humankind have been hotly debated for centuries. Kant (1785/1996) spoke of duty devoid of emotions and personal desires. In contrast, Hume (1751/1998) believed in an innate sensitivity toward others and that altruistic behavior results from moral emotions such as sympathy and compassion. Hobbes (1651/1958) contended that altruistic behavior reduces negative emotions and wins approval from others thereby allowing self-interested individuals to reap the benefits of group life. Although testing the ‘true motives’ underlying prosocial and moral behavior is not commonly addressed in developmental inquiry, the aforementioned philosophical orientations are ever-present.

The tension between self-interest and group life described by Hobbes was well recognized by Freud (1930). According to Freud, inherently self-interested individuals come to internalize societal norms which then guide behavior. Guilt and anxiety are reduced by behaving according to these internalized sanctions. Both Freud’s and Hobbes’ views find commonality with modern evolutionary approaches which suggest that personal goals are best achieved by socially acceptable behavior, especially if those ways are consistent with moral norms. Evolutionists generally doubt that the underlying motivations to moral action are truly altruistic (Hamilton, 1964; but see Wilson, 1993) but believe instead that these motives ultimately arose from individuals resolving the self/group tension. Selective forces, therefore, should operate to create individuals who can satisfy their naturally self-interested inclinations while appearing to be upstanding group members (e.g., Hawley, 2003; Trivers, 1971; Wright, 1994). Highly developed moral reasoning (or justification) need not be accompanied by moral behavior.

In contrast, the prevailing sentiment in developmental circles appears to be that morally developed individuals should behave morally and less out of rudimentary self interest (Blasi, 1980; Krebs & van Hesteren, 1994; Kohlberg, 1981). Consistent with this reasoning, those engaging in antisocial behavior should have deficits in their moral orientations and/or skew the way they perceive the social world (e.g., Crick & Dodge, 1994; but see Pepler, Craig, & Roberts, 1998; Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999a).

The present study explores the moral thinking, self-reported moral emotions, and social problem solving strategies of preschool children. Is developmentally advanced moral thinking associated with a prosocial or moral orientation? Evolutionary theory is employed to suggest that this may not be the case and that there may be aggressive children who are morally developed, their self-interested behavior notwithstanding.

Much of the work conducted by developmentalists in the domain of moral or prosocial behavior stems from the social cognitive tradition, namely that of Piaget (1965) and, later, Kohlberg (1981). To Piaget, moral reasoning progresses through largely invariant stages as a function of sociocognitive development by way of individuals’ reciprocal interactions with the social and material environments. Perspective taking abilities emerge and egocentrism diminishes as the child matures. As a result, concepts such as fairness and justice develop out of emerging understandings of mutual respect, cooperation, and behavioral guidelines (e.g., rules, laws; see also Youniss, 1980). Characteristic of this development, understanding of rules progresses from obligatory obedience to authority to self-guided, flexible, moral guidelines. Kohlberg continued this tradition with his exploration of children’s judgments about moral issues such as those concerning interpersonal obligations, justice, and law. As such, he deemphasized Freudian notions of anxiety and guilt, and underplayed moral emotions such as empathy and sympathy. His work centered on philosophical considerations in the measurement of morality and normative progression of self-reported moral analysis rather than on moral behavior per se, the prediction of individual differences in moral reasoning, or moral emotions (e.g., guilt).

Because of the presumed role of social context and maturational factors, sociocognitive theoretical orientations engender questions regarding the roles of peer relationships and cognitive skills (e.g., perspective taking and intelligence) on prosocial and moral behavior. Consistent with the Piagetian/Kohlbergian approach, positive associations have been found between prosocial behavior and intelligence (Abroms & Gollin, 1980; Mussen, Rutherford, Harris, & Keasey, 1970), perspective taking (perceptual, affective, and cognitive; Underwood & Moore, 1982), and involvement in positive peer relationships (Coie, Dodge, & Kuperschmidt, 1990; Tremblay, Vitaro, Gagnon, Piche, & Royer, 1992). Reasonably intelligent children who are well-integrated in the peer group appear to have ample opportunity to learn and differentiate others’ perspectives, emotional responses and personal goals from their own. As a consequence, these children become well-equipped to behave within social norms, treat others with respect and care, and, accordingly, are liked by their peers (e.g., Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs, & Leiberman, 1983).

Some studies in aggression complement this view. Aggressive children not only eschew accepted rules of behavior, but also poorly understand the perspectives of others (Chandler, 1973), engage in faulty reasoning regarding social situations (hostile attribution bias; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1980; Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 1979), and accordingly repel peers (Coie & Dodge, 1998; Coie et al., 1990; but see Hawley, 2003; Rodkin, Farmer, Pearl, & Van Acker, 2000).

Hoffman later emphasized the role of emotions in morality and moral development. His influential approach to empathy (Hoffman, 1976, Hoffman, 1982) stimulated additional lines of research exploring children’s emotional lives and prosociality. Eisenberg and her colleagues, for example, have explored extensively the distinction between empathy and sympathy and their effects on behaviors such as helping and sharing. Overall, children capable of empathic and sympathetic responding are more likely to engage in prosocial behavior. However, if empathy spills over into personal distress, then prosocial behavior decreases. Personality factors may also be relevant. Characteristics such as positivity (e.g., cheerfulness, warmth) incline a child to prosociality (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997) as does emotion regulation (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989). Not all studies, however, report similar results; many correlations are reversed or non-existent (see Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998 for review).

Additionally, prosocial motivation appears to be relatively weak and corruptible. For example, prosocial behavior may be exhibited when it involves helping or sharing (relatively low cost behaviors), but not when the cost is slightly higher, as in self-denial (e.g., donation; Grusec & Skubinski, 1970). Prosocial behavior may not occur unless an adult is present (Zarbatany, Hartmann, & Gelfand, 1985). Material or social reinforcements may increase prosocial behavior in the immediate context (Eisenberg et al., 1993), but not necessarily (Mills & Grusec, 1989). Furthermore, tangible rewards may reduce the likelihood of future positive behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Lepper & Henderlong, 2000). Similarly, classic experiments in social psychology demonstrate how disturbingly easy it is for individuals to behave in (injurious) ways that are at odds with their own principles (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Milgram, 1963). Furthermore, Batson’s work on moral hypocrisy (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling, Whitney, & Strongman, 1999) has shown that appearing moral seems to be as important, if not more important, than actually being moral to many participants in his studies. Taken together, one is impressed by how strongly inclined people are to behave out of self interest, even when the cost of doing otherwise is relatively low.

Evolutionary theorists agree that prosocial behavior is a natural component to human social orientation, but they would add that the ultimate force underlying it is probably self-interest (e.g., Alexander, 1979; Pinker, 1997; Williams, 1966). Working well with others within social groups is perhaps one of our more important and impressive adaptations. But as with nearly all adaptations, the ultimate goal is self-preservation and perpetuation. We help others, evolutionary theorists would argue, because in the long run they will help us in return (or our reputations are bolstered). The theory of reciprocal altruism as originally written by Trivers (1971) suggests that a good strategy is to be a good reciprocal altruist; others would be attracted to the reciprocal altruist and offer support in return because the reciprocal altruist genuinely appears to do so willingly as well. An alternative to being a true reciprocal altruist, according to Trivers, is appearing to be a good reciprocator while slyly taking more than one gives (see also Alexander, 1979; Pinker, 1997; Wright, 1994). In the long run, this strategy would yield large benefits over others without incurring the costs of blatant cheating.

Many misinterpret evolutionary approaches to mean that the characteristic in question would be common to all (i.e., adaptations; see, for example, Turiel, 1998). If cheating is advantageous, the faulty argument goes, then a population would be swamped with genetic cheaters and the competitive advantage of cheating would be lost. This outmoded view misunderstands the role that environmental or social factors play in providing context for strategic differentiation (i.e., individual differences). Individuals employ strategies in the presence of others also employing strategies (e.g., Axelrod, 1984). One’s own phenotype (e.g., size, gender, personality) provides information about which strategies are feasible or optimal, and under what conditions (Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).

Strategic differentiation has been explored in the context of children’s resource oriented behavior. Successful access to preferred resources in the social group would lead one to be referred to as socially dominant (Hawley, 1999). This theoretical orientation proposes that various strategies of resource competition would arise in the peer group. Coercive strategies, those which are direct, aversive, and immediate (e.g., taking, threatening), find similarity with traditional conceptions of social dominance in the ethological literature (e.g., Bernstein, 1981; Strayer & Strayer, 1976). Prosocial strategies of resource control, however, find their theoretical counterpart in evolutionary approaches to cooperation (Alexander, 1979; Axelrod, 1984; Charlesworth, 1988, Charlesworth, 1996; Trivers, 1971). Reciprocity, cooperation, unsolicited help, and positive alliance formation (i.e., friendships) can serve successful resource acquisition. In contrast to coercive strategies, prosocial strategies are indirect, prolonged, and generally win positive group regard. This relation between prosociality and resource control has been documented empirically in preschool children (Hawley, 2002; LaFreniere & Charlesworth, 1987).

In principle, the degree to which an individual employs prosocial and coercive strategies of resource control can be measured independently by way of observation (Hawley, 2002; LaFreniere & Charlesworth, 1987), self-report (Hawley, 2003; Hawley, Little, & Pasupathi, 2002), or other report (Hawley, 2003). Based on the relative degree of endorsement or employment of the strategies, subgroups of individuals can be identified; bistrategics employ both strategies, coercive controllers employ coercive strategies over prosocial strategies, prosocial controllers employ prosocial strategies over coercive strategies, and noncontrollers employ neither. Profiles of the types are emerging in terms of associated personality traits (which presumably underlie resource directedness and strategy utilized) and social and personal outcomes resulting from successful/unsuccessful control and the strategy employed (Hawley, 2003; Hawley et al., 2002).

Bistrategic controllers confound commonly accepted views of social competence (Hawley, 2003; Hawley et al., 2002); they possess skills associated with traditional measures of social competence (e.g., they attract peers, are socially skilled, reasonably conscientious, extroverted, teachers see them as socially well-integrated and non-aggressive). At the same time—by their own admission—bistrategic preadolescents and adolescents cheat, have a very high need for recognition from others, and are among the most aggressive children in the school yard (Hawley, 2003; Hawley et al., 2002). Most developmental theories predict that such antisocial behavior would be associated with social skills deficits and peer rejection (Coie & Dodge, 1998; but see Sutton et al., 1999a, Sutton et al., 1999b, Sutton et al., 1999c). In contrast, bistrategic controllers show an intriguing combination of traits that suggests a socially adept, well-integrated, manipulative, and covertly aggressive individual (covert in the sense that peers report the aggression, but teachers do not). In addition, they appear to be extremely effective resource controllers in their own opinion and in the opinion of their peers (Hawley, 2003). Although boys are commonly held to be more aggressive than girls (Coie & Dodge, 1998, but see Crick & Grotpeter, 1995), girls are as likely to be bistrategics as boys (Hawley, 2003).

Are bistrategic preschoolers rated as aggressive as their adolescent counterparts? If so, are they morally underdeveloped? Do they hold commonly accepted views of right and wrong, or is righteousness viewed in terms of what is good for them? Different theoretical orientations would make different predictions. Traditional and currently dominant approaches might suggest that these children would experience social-cognitive deficits associated with antisocial behavior (e.g., faulty perspective taking, poorly internalized norms, immature moral development; e.g., Lochman & Dodge, 1994). In contrast, evolutionary theorists (Alexander, 1979; Trivers, 1985; Wright, 1994) might hypothesize that the skills these individuals possess would also underlie their ability to appear moral, without actually behaving morally. These skills, furthermore, may underlie their ability to ascend the social dominance hierarchy. The present study compares the self-reported moral interpretations of bistrategics with coercive controllers and prosocial controllers, and other children who operate less out of self-interest (e.g., noncontrollers). Because boys and girls are likely to engage in different forms of aggressive behavior—girls favor relational forms of aggression (e.g., gossip, social exclusion; Crick, Casas, & Mosher, 1997; Crick & Grotpeter, 1995) whereas boys favor physical and/or direct forms of aggression (i.e., overt aggression)—the different forms of aggression (relational and overt) are explored especially as they relate to gender differences.

Section snippets

Participants

Participants included 163 children and their families and teachers recruited from six preschools (14 classrooms, each with 9–20 children) from the communities around New Haven, Connecticut. Data were collected on 90 European-American children (55.2% of the sample), 46 African-American children (28.2%), 21 Hispanic-American children (12.9%), and 6 Asian-American children (3.7% of the sample). The average age of these children was 4.29 years (SD=.74; range 2.86–5.95 years). Eighty-nine of the

Resource control strategies

In a multi-item questionnaire format, teachers were asked to rate each child using a 7-point scale on prosocial strategies of control (six items; “S/he is someone who influences others by doing something in return”), coercive strategies of control (six items; “S/he bullies or pushes other to do what s/he wants”), and resource control (six items; “S/he gets what she wants even if others don’t”). High scores indicate higher endorsement of employing the strategy. Table 1 provides raw means,

Results

In this section, partial correlation coefficients (controlling for age) are presented first. Second, gender differences on variable clusters (i.e., via MANOVAs with age partialled) are examined followed by an exploration of mean differences on variable clusters by type (again, with age partialled). For both the gender and type analyses, significant MANOVAS (with age partialled) are followed by univariate tests and apriori contrasts comparing bistrategics to coercive contollers, bistrategics to

Discussion

Aggressive children are commonly believed to be morally underdeveloped. Yet, “aggressive children” are increasingly being recognized as a heterogeneous group (e.g., Hawley, 2003; Rodkin et al., 2000; Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999c). The present study explored this heterogeneity within the context of resource control theory, which hypothesizes two distinct groups of aggressive children: unskilled controllers and socially skilled bistrategic controllers.

First, a number of relations stand out

Conclusions

Morality is the device of an animal of exceptional cognitive complexity, pursuing its interests in an exceptionally complex social universe.

Daly and Wilson, 1988 (p. 254)

An evolutionary perspective is not the only one useful to view these data. Interesting inferences can be drawn, for example, on the social activity argument alone, which is quite consistent with Piagetian points of view (for an additional perspective, see Sutton et al., 1999a, Sutton et al., 1999b). Nonetheless,

Acknowledgements

This research was funded by a grant from the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation. Special thanks are due to J. Burda, C. DeGennaro, S. Durso, L. Elder, A. Gambaccini, H. Goodby, C. McManus, M. Peterson, G. Saunders, M. Woeber, and V. Zyck for aiding in data collection.

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