Article Figures & Data
Figures
- Figure 1.
Highly schematized account of the transformation from visual input to verbal output. Light reflecting from an apple (Item 1) is transduced into neural signals. The neural information is rendered into an embedding or a model (Item 2) which consists of a complex pattern of activity among neurons. The visual model influences a higher cognitive network (Item 3) that incorporates semantic embeddings. The higher cognitive network influences a speech network (Item 4) that constructs the correct neuronal output signals to activate speech muscles and produce Bob's verbal utterance.
- Figure 2.
Highly schematized account of the transformation from an unknown Item 1 to the verbal claim that conscious experience is present. In Hypothesis 1, Item 1 is a magical mind essence. In Hypothesis 2, Item 1 does not exist. In Hypothesis 3, Item 1 is the integration of information. In Hypothesis 4, Item 1 is Item 3, in a recursive loop. In Hypothesis 5, Item 1 is attentional enhancement. In Hypothesis 6, Item 1 is the deep, selective processing of information in the brain, which is associated with integrated information, the global workspace, and attention.
- Figure 3.
Arrow A and Arrow B. Arrow A is the first explanatory gap. How can physical neurons give rise to an ethereal feeling? Arrow B is the second, equally important, explanatory gap. Once the feeling is generated, how does it then physically impact neuronal activity, such that it can be transduced into a neural embedding or a model, such that higher cognition can form the semantic idea that it is present, such that people can say that they have it?
- Figure 4.
The causality is broken without Arrow B. If the brain has no mechanism for detecting conscious feeling, such that it can no longer be represented in a neural code, then people have no way to think about or talk about that consciousness. Without Arrow B, when people form the semantic idea that they have conscious experience, when they say they have conscious experience, and when they describe specific properties and features of conscious feeling, none of those events are based on an actual conscious feeling generated by the brain. Theories that propose an Arrow A but ignore Arrow B are not explanatory.
In this issue
Jump to section
- Article
- Abstract
- Significance Statement
- Introduction
- From Vision to Speech
- From Self Model to Speech
- Hypothesis 1: The Magical Mind and the Problem of Arrow B
- Hypothesis 2: Hard Illusionism
- Hypothesis 3: The Illusionist Version of the Integrated Information Theory
- Hypothesis 4: The Illusionist Version of the Global Workspace Theory
- Hypothesis 5: The Attention Schema Theory
- Hypothesis 6: Deep Illusionism, or Many Keyhole Perspectives on a Deeper Theory
- Why a Mechanistic Theory of Consciousness Is Important
- Footnotes
- References
- Synthesis
- Author Response
- Figures & Data
- Info & Metrics
- eLetters